Last updated: November 20, 2026, 12:00 UTC. This is a rapidly evolving situation and we will keep this article updated. The stolen funds are moving fast and in complex ways, so the description here may not be complete.
Key points
- The laundering is highly complex and clearly automated, using more than 27,000 wallets on at least 16 blockchains, about 55 services and about 90,000 transactions.
- Around $2.35 billion remains in addresses linked to the theft, mostly ETH and BTC, and very little has been cashed out.
- Funds that have not moved are very likely still held by North Korea, while those being laundered may be with Chinese money laundering networks.
- Since November 17, five of the nine largest ETH addresses have been emptied, moving about 488,000 ETH ($860 million). Most of it is waiting in batches of 12,000 ETH, and about 39,000 ETH ($70 million) has so far been swapped for bitcoin.
- Almost all of the stolen XRP ($220 million), TRX ($200 million) and SOL ($90 million) has been swapped into other assets, but only about $2 million of the NEAR has moved.
- At least 2,310 BTC ($149 million) of the stolen funds has gone into coinjoins, almost all of them coordinated by Kruw and most of it since November 17, with smaller amounts going into other mixers.
- As after the Bybit hack, the ETH is being swapped for bitcoin and mixed, and we expect it to be cashed out through OTC brokers and exchanges, although we have seen little sign of that so far.
What happened
On October 29, $6.43 billion in cryptoassets was stolen from Binance, one of the world's largest cryptocurrency exchanges, across 11 different blockchains. Binance says the attack was a multi-stage campaign rather than a single breach. In June, one engineer installed a tampered copy of an AI coding tool, which exposed the wallet team to the attackers. In September, attackers posing as recruiters put another engineer through fake job interviews and had him download a malicious “assignment” onto his work computer.
From there, they used an internal AI tool to reach other engineers' machines, and on October 29 they used that access to reach Binance's wallet signing service. Our earlier article covers the attack and the attribution in detail. The laundering that followed has been highly complex, using more than 27,000 wallets on at least 16 blockchains, about 55 services and about 90,000 transactions.
Below we describe how the stolen funds have been laundered so far, in stages. When we refer to “the attacker”, we mean whoever controls the wallets now holding the funds, since the blockchain shows us those wallets but not who is behind them.
October 29: a race against the freezes
The theft took place between 20:05 and 23:56 UTC on October 29. Of the $6.43 billion taken, $3.46 billion (54%) was in stablecoins such as USDT and USDC, which can be frozen by the companies that issue them, such as Tether and Circle. The attacker's first priority was therefore to swap the stablecoins for assets that cannot be frozen, such as ETH and TRX.
On Ethereum, Tether froze the stolen USDT 37 minutes after it arrived. Before the freeze, the attacker managed to swap 434 million USDT for ETH on decentralized exchanges (DEXs) such as Uniswap, and borrowed a further 19,762 ETH on the lending protocol Aave against 59.9 million USDT. On Tron, it swapped 234 million USDT for TRX on SunSwap before Tether froze the rest. Circle froze all 823 million stolen USDC before any of it could be swapped.
In total, $2.85 billion has been frozen or seized, but around $786 million of stablecoins was converted before the freezes took effect. In the same half hour, the 18,270 stolen BTC was split across 19 addresses, where it has stayed ever since.
October 30 to November 1: the TRX is spread out and bridged to Ethereum
After a five-hour pause, at 02:19 UTC on October 30, a single distribution wallet began sending the attacker's 684.6 million TRX out in small amounts to hundreds of new addresses, from where it spread across about 7,700. Within two and a half hours the attacker had also made its first transfers through six different cross-chain bridges, mostly with test-sized amounts. These bridges take an asset on one blockchain and pay out an asset on another, and almost all of the TRX was paid out as ETH on Ethereum. At least $147 million left Tron this way.
On Ethereum, the arriving ETH was forwarded to new addresses and then left there, mostly in amounts of between 10 and 100 ETH. The nine largest ETH addresses, which held 89% of the attacker's ETH, did not move again until November 17.
On October 31 the attacker added new routes and sped up. Some TRX was swapped for USDD, a stablecoin that markets itself as "freeze-free", meaning that no central party can freeze it. One address also put 128 million TRX through a JustLend lending vault, depositing from one address and withdrawing to 16 new ones so that no direct transfer links them. Meanwhile the distribution wallet went from sending under 12 million TRX an hour to as much as 37 million, and it kept running through both nights in Pyongyang. At its peak, the attacker's Tron wallets were making around 1,300 transactions an hour.
At 11:34 UTC that day, THORChain, one of the bridges the attacker had been using, halted swaps on most of its blockchains after a technical fault. It had been taking in around 10 million TRX an hour from the attacker, but the laundering carried on regardless as the attacker switched to other bridges. That evening the FBI attributed the theft to TraderTraitor, published the attacker's addresses and urged THORChain node operators and other services to block transactions linked to them.
The distribution wallet made its last transfer at 05:33 UTC on November 1, after 1,113 transfers in 51 hours, and Tron then went quiet. Activity moved to other chains, with NEAR being sent to new accounts, some of the parked ETH moving in batches of around 10 ETH, and around half of the SOL being moved to a new address.
November 2 to 4: the SOL is sold, and the mixing begins
On November 2 the attacker turned to Solana, selling batches of SOL for USDC, bridging it to Ethereum, swapping it for ETH and then swapping that into bitcoin, with each batch taking about an hour. One batch crossed four blockchains in under five hours. SOL was also passed through lending vaults and a liquid-staking service, the same technique used earlier on Tron. Early that day, all 233 million XRP was moved to six new addresses, where it stayed until November 5.
The pace picked up on November 3, when about 137,000 SOL ($12.8 million) left the original Solana theft wallet in dozens of batches. Early on November 4 the attacker moved the other half of the SOL back into that wallet, which then sent out about 725,000 SOL ($67 million) to 77 new wallets by 09:07 UTC. Much of this was sold for USDC through DEXs and market makers and bridged to Ethereum and other blockchains. THORChain had reopened late on November 3 and the attacker made use of it straight away, so that by the evening of November 4 about 12,200 ETH ($29 million), most of it from the sale of SOL, had gone through THORChain into bitcoin. By the afternoon of November 4 the theft wallet was empty, and only about 430 SOL was left in addresses linked to the theft.
On Tron, smaller wallets were emptied by swapping TRX for USDT and USDD, passing it through a lending market and then swapping it onward into bitcoin, with the USDT never staying in one wallet for more than a minute.
This period also saw the first mixing of the stolen funds. From about 01:00 UTC on November 2, stolen bitcoin began going into coinjoins using WabiSabi, the protocol used by Wasabi Wallet and similar wallets. A coinjoin combines many users' bitcoin in a single transaction, breaking the visible link between the coins going in and those coming out. The amounts were small at first, about 8 BTC ($600,000) over November 2 and 3. On November 3 and 4 about $6.7 million was also deposited into Privacy Cash, a privacy protocol that runs shared pools on Ethereum and Solana, from which funds can be withdrawn to a new address with no visible link to the deposit. Later on November 4, Privacy Cash paused deposits while it strengthened its wallet screening, citing the Binance hack.
By now the laundering was converging on bitcoin. By the morning of November 4, about 470 BTC ($37 million) converted from other stolen assets sat in new bitcoin addresses, more than double the figure a day earlier. That afternoon, following a rise in the price of ETH, part of the attacker's Aave loan was liquidated, with a liquidator repaying about 9,900 ETH of the debt and taking about 24 million USDT of the collateral.
November 5 to 12: the XRP goes through THORChain into bitcoin
From the afternoon of November 5 the XRP was laundered in the same way. Two of the six addresses that had received it on November 2 sent it on to dozens of new accounts, which swapped it through THORChain, mostly into bitcoin. This happened quickly, and by the morning of November 7 about 86 million XRP ($100 million) had left the attacker's XRP addresses, by which time the bitcoin converted from other stolen assets had grown to about 2,300 BTC ($175 million).
THORChain's halts did little to stop this. It halted XRP trading later on November 7, leaving some of the attacker's XRP stuck in transit, but swaps from the attacker's accounts were going through again by the afternoon of November 8. THORChain appeared to halt XRP swaps again on November 10, and paused XRP trading once more on November 12. By that point the last of the six addresses had been emptied and only about 8.5 million XRP ($9 million) remained, while about 4,100 BTC ($285 million) sat in new bitcoin addresses, up from about 470 BTC on November 4.
Smaller flows continued elsewhere. On Tron, the largest remaining wallet swapped about 7.4 million TRX into bitcoin in batches of about 1.5 million TRX, and NEAR left its main account in small batches. The launderers also created their own worthless meme tokens and traded them through liquidity pools, so that the stolen funds never passed directly from one wallet to another. We have seen this on Tron and NEAR, with a close variant on Solana, and on NEAR about 117,000 NEAR (around $430,000) passed through six home-made tokens.
Mixing also grew, much of it using bitcoin that THORChain had just paid out from the XRP swaps, and by November 12 about 135 BTC ($10 million) had gone into coinjoins in total. From November 8 the trail also reached Tornado Cash, one of the best-known mixers. Some of the ETH deposited there had been bought back through THORChain with bitcoin that had already been through coinjoins, and by November 10 we estimated that about 11,000 ETH had gone into Tornado Cash. Privacy Cash reopened deposits to its Solana pool on November 5, but we saw no further deposits from addresses linked to the theft.
November 13 to 16: the laundering slows
THORChain reopened XRP trading on November 13, and about 7 million more XRP was swapped into bitcoin by November 14, leaving only about 1.3 million. Small amounts of ETH and TRX were also swapped into bitcoin and about 87 BTC ($6 million) went into coinjoins, but otherwise activity was light and the main bitcoin and ETH holdings still had not moved. By November 16 about 4,150 BTC sat in new bitcoin addresses, and around $2.55 billion remained in addresses linked to the theft, down by about $205 million in three days because of falling prices.
November 17 to 20: the main ETH holdings move, and mixing in coinjoins coordinated by Kruw
On November 17 the main ETH holdings moved for the first time since October 30. Over the following four days the attacker emptied five of the nine largest ETH addresses, each time between 06:50 and 08:30 UTC: 74,880 ETH from two addresses on November 17, 78,415 ETH on November 18, 137,602 ETH on November 19 and 197,460 ETH on November 20. Each time the ETH was split into batches of 12,000 ETH. In all about 488,000 ETH ($860 million) has been moved, although most of it is still sitting untouched in the new batches, and the other four largest addresses hold about 41,000 ETH ($73 million).
The batches are being swapped one or two at a time. Each is split across about ten new addresses, which swap it for bitcoin through THORChain in hundreds of small deposits, as North Korea did after the Bybit hack in 2025. The swaps run in long bursts with pauses of several hours, the longest being about 11 hours overnight from November 18 to 19. Since November 17 about 39,000 ETH ($70 million) has been swapped for about 1,100 BTC, and at that pace swapping the rest of the batches would take well over a month.
Much of this new bitcoin goes straight into coinjoins, often within two hours of arriving. On November 17 about 480 BTC ($31 million) of the stolen funds went into coinjoins for the first time, more than in the previous two weeks combined. This rose to about 590 BTC ($38 million) on November 18, the most in a single day so far, followed by about 520 BTC ($33 million) on November 19 and about 490 BTC ($30 million) by 11:42 UTC on November 20. Not all of this has come from the ETH swaps, as on November 20 about 210 BTC came from bitcoin converted from XRP earlier in the month. In total, at least 2,310 BTC ($149 million) has gone into coinjoins since November 1, about 90% of it in the last four days.
Almost all of these coinjoins were coordinated by Kruw, the most widely used coordinator for Wasabi Wallet users. A coordinator organises each coinjoin round, bringing together the users taking part, but never takes custody of their funds.
These figures count each stolen bitcoin once, when it first enters a coinjoin, so they are a minimum. Much of the bitcoin has since been mixed again.
The 18,270 BTC stolen directly from Binance has still not moved since it was split into 19 addresses on the night of the theft. The bitcoin being laundered is different: it was converted from other stolen assets, mainly ETH, XRP and SOL. About 3,200 BTC ($200 million) of this converted bitcoin still sits in new bitcoin addresses, down from about 3,500 BTC on November 19 as more of it goes into coinjoins. Around $2.35 billion remains in addresses linked to the theft, with part of the fall since November 19 due to lower prices.
Tactics to make funds tracing more difficult
The attacker has combined several standard techniques. None is new, but together they make the funds much harder to track:
- Splitting the funds across thousands of new addresses, so there are many more transactions to follow.
- Moving between blockchains through bridges and cross-chain swap services. The deposit and the payout are separate transactions on different chains, and some batches have crossed four blockchains in a few hours.
- Swapping between assets on DEXs, so the asset being followed keeps changing.
- Hopping through lending vaults and liquid-staking services on Tron and Solana, so that no direct transfer links the sending and receiving addresses.
- Trading through home-made meme tokens on Tron and NEAR, so the funds pass through a trading pool rather than straight from one wallet to another.
- Mixing bitcoin through coinjoins, ETH and SOL through the Privacy Cash protocol, and ETH through Tornado Cash. All three pool many users' funds and break the visible link between the funds going in and coming out.
Splitting also helps in other ways. Smaller amounts can be swapped or bridged without moving prices, they stand out less to exchanges that screen incoming funds, and they can be laundered in small batches at a pace of the attacker's choosing.
Is the laundering automated?
The speed of the laundering has led to speculation that AI agents are moving the funds, but the evidence points to conventional automation: fixed timing, set amounts, blind retries and new tactics introduced in steps hours apart, as well as pauses that look like human working patterns.
The scale alone points to software. On Tron, the stolen funds moved in about 34,000 transactions, peaking at around 1,300 in a single hour, or one every three seconds, and each dollar laundered on Tron was moved about nine times. The laundering is clearly automated, but nothing we have seen shows an AI agent making decisions.
The timing also suggests that each new step is started on a schedule. Each of the five times a main ETH address was emptied, it happened between 06:50 and 08:30 UTC, while the swaps that followed ran day and night.
Where the funds are now
Of the $6.43 billion stolen, $2.85 billion is frozen and around $2.35 billion remains in addresses linked to the theft. Most of this has not yet been laundered, including the 18,270 BTC stolen directly from Binance, which has not moved since the night of the theft, and most of the ETH, which has been split into new batches but not yet swapped. These funds are very likely still held by North Korea, but the funds already being laundered may not be. In previous cases North Korea has handed stolen funds to Chinese money laundering networks, and on-chain data cannot show whether that has happened here. Around $16 million has been sent to addresses that also hold proceeds of the September 2026 Bitget exploit, which is also believed to be the work of TraderTraitor.
Has any of it been cashed out?
A negligible amount has likely been cashed out so far. Most of what has happened is conversion, where the funds have changed asset but remain on public blockchains in addresses linked to the theft. To turn them into money it can spend, the attacker needs a counterparty such as a centralized exchange or an over-the-counter (OTC) broker, and that is where the funds can potentially be identified and stopped.
What happens next
After the Bybit hack in February 2025, North Korea laundered all 499,000 stolen ETH within ten days, mostly by swapping it for bitcoin, although cashing out then took months. Elliptic found that the Bybit funds were ultimately converted to USDT on Tron and cashed out through suspected Chinese over-the-counter (OTC) trading services.
The Binance laundering has been slower so far. ETH and BTC cannot be frozen, so there is no rush, and with sums more than twice those stolen from Bybit, moving them quickly would mean large losses on swaps. With the attacker's addresses published by the FBI, services are also watching. We expect the ETH to be swapped for bitcoin in many small transactions, mixed, and then cashed out through OTC brokers over a period of months. The SOL and XRP have followed this pattern, with much of it ending up as bitcoin, and since November 17 the main ETH holdings have started to move the same way, through THORChain into bitcoin and then often into coinjoins coordinated by Kruw within hours. Mixing makes the funds harder to follow, but to be cashed out they will still have to reach a counterparty such as an exchange or OTC broker.
Further freezes will be harder. Freezing 44% of the stolen funds is already unusual, given that around 3% was frozen after the Bybit hack. The best remaining chances are stablecoins caught briefly in transit, where Elliptic alerts have already led to freezes, and centralized services at the point of cash-out.
What this means for compliance teams
To be cashed out, the stolen funds will have to pass through centralized services. Elliptic traces them across bridges, DeFi protocols and new addresses and updates its screening data as they move, so compliance teams do not need to follow each hop themselves. Elliptic customers can screen against more than 33,000 addresses linked to the theft, and our free blocklist is available to any business.
Additionally, Fast Track Monitoring gives compliance teams a backup for wallet and transaction screening if their primary screening service becomes unavailable. It runs on Elliptic Lens, with a clear, explainable risk score on every wallet and transaction, and includes the labels for addresses linked to this theft. Start screening with Fast Track Monitoring.
We will continue to report on the laundering as the funds move.